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BUILDING REPUTATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS:
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL AUDIENCES
Nuno Garoupa* & Tom Ginsburg**
I. INTRODUCTION
Specialized constitutional courts have expanded all over the world in
recent decades. Originally conceived by the great legal theorist Hans Kelsen for
the Austrian Constitution of 1920 and later adopted in post-war Germany and
Italy, they have expanded to Southern Europe, Asia, and Eastern Europe during
subsequent waves of democratization.' Even some Latin American countries,
though historically influenced by U.S. constitutional arrangements, have adopted
versions of the Kelsenian model; examples include Chile (1981), Colombia
(1991), Bolivia (1994), and Ecuador (1996).2 The most notable exceptions in
Europe are the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries that have not (yet)
adopted a Kelsenian model. Initially, France embraced a much narrower judicial
review of legislation in accordance with its traditions of parliamentary
sovereignty, but its court (the Conseil Constitutionnel) is coming to resemble the
specialized Kelsenian model of institutional design.4
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1. See generally Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS, 81-95 (Daniel Keleman & Keith
Whittington eds., 2008).
2. CONSTITuci6N POLiTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 81-83;
CONsTITUCION POLiTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 239-245; CONSTITuCl6N POLITICA DE
BOLIVIA [C.P.] art. 119; CONSTITUClON POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [C.P.]
arts. 174-178.
3. Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts, 5 INT'L J. OF
CONST. L. 44, 44 (2007).
4. See ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 226-30 (1992); Alec Stone
Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe, 5 INT'L J. CONsT. L.
69, 70 (2007); Henry J. Abraham, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 310-11 (5th ed. 1986)
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The ideas and legal theories of Kelsen and his model of the court as a
"negative legislator" have influenced the design of specialized constitutional
courts in the Western world. Kelsen, in accordance with his positivist
jurisprudence, believed in a strict hierarchy of laws and that ordinary judges
should apply only law that is legislated by the parliament. To effectively restrain
the legislature and ensure the compatibility of law with the higher normative order
7
of the constitution, Kelsen believed, a special, extrajudicial organ was necessary.
The Kelsenian model establishes a centralized body outside of the structure of the
conventional judiciary to exercise constitutional review and act as the guarantor of
the constitutional order. This body, typically called a constitutional court,
operates as a negative legislator because it has the power to reject but not propose
legislation.8
The application of the Kelsenian model in each country depends on local
conditions, and the general trend has been toward expanding the competencies of
constitutional courts over time well beyond Kelsen's simple model of the negative
legislator. One distinction is between concrete and abstract review. In some
countries, the courts can consider disputes only in the context of real legal
disputes; the U.S. limitation of judicial review to "cases and controversies" is an
example of this "concrete" approach.9 In others, courts can hear challenges to
legislation as a general or "abstract" matter. The Constitutional Court of Germany
has both abstract and concrete review powers.1o France, the last bastion against
concrete review, recently succumbed." At the same time, most constitutional
courts have expanded ancillary powers in important areas such as verifying
(discussing the French constitutional court). The introduction of concrete review after the
2008 constitutional reform will increase the similarities between the French Conseil
Constitutionnel and the other Kelsenian courts in Europe. See infra note 11.
5. See generally ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN EUROPE 134-35 (2000). See also Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of
Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POL.
183, 187 (1942). The notion of a "negative legislator" is based on the idea that the court
expels legislation from the system and therefore shares legislative power with the
parliament. Id.
6. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 134-36 (1945).
7. Id. at 157.
8. Id. at 268-69.
9. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 13 (2d ed. 1997).
11. Loi constitutionnelle 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des
institutions de la Vme R6publique [Constitutional Law 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 on the
Modernization of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.0.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 23, 2008. Concrete
review is now possible according to the French Constitution as the Cour de Cassation and
the Conseil d'btat can refer to the Conseil Constitutionnel in matters of law (to be
developed by statute soon). Id. art. 61-1.
Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts
elections, governing political parties (declaring them illegal or regulating their
activities), and other relevant political, judicial, and administrative functions.1 2
Comparative legal scholars have considered the development of the
Kelsenian model as one of the most relevant transformations of legal systems in
the last fifty years. 3  They also praise these courts' ability to avoid the
politicization that exists in American courts. 14  Constitutional judges in the
Kelsenian model do not seem to develop "ideologically distinct public
personalities," as some legal scholars have said.'5 Moreover, even if an
appointment is political in nature, there is no process of campaigning for a certain
type ofjudge or judicial philosophy.16
This article examines internal consensus and fragmentation of the
constitutional court as a function of the need to communicate to two different
external audiences: political and judicial. The political audience consists of other
branches of government and the political establishment more generally.
Constitutional courts are inevitably political actors. Even in the narrow sense of a
Kelsenian negative legislator, they have the power to reject legislation, and hence
their decisions have political consequences. Constitutional judges are political
agents, in part because the appointment mechanism is usually politicized and has
sometimes resulted in stable de facto quotas for influential political parties.' 7 The
interaction of constitutional judges and the political audience is not fully
understood, but scholars have tended to rely on several hypotheses about judicial
behavior; some believe that judges tend to seek to advance the preferences of their
appointers, and others view judges as primarily concerned about their future once
their term in the court is over.18  Even if they have life tenure, prospective
appointments for other prestigious governmental posts or profitable legal
consultancy jobs after they retire may influence judges' decision-making.19
The interaction between politics and constitutional and statutory
interpretation has been the focus of much theoretical and empirical literature on
12. See Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Judicial Review: Ancillary Powers of Constitutional
Courts, in INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 225, 230-31 (Tom
Ginsburg & Peter Lang eds., 2005); Tom Ginsburg & Zachary Elkins, Ancillary Powers of
Constitutional Courts, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1431, 1440-41 (2009).
13. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons




17. See, e.g., KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 22 (describing political influence on
appointments in Germany).
18. See JEFFREY SEGAL & HERBERT SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (arguing that appointment politics dictate judicial
behavior); BATHULA VENKATESWARA RAO, CRIsIs IN INDIAN JUDICIARY 150 (2001) (judges
interested in post-retirement jobs).
19. RAO, supra note 18, at 150.
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the U.S. Supreme Court and most constitutional courts. 20 Many scholars have
discussed the extent to which judges advance their own ideologies while
sacrificing formalism and originalism. 21 Others have considered the
judicialization of the legislative body, as government branches try to anticipate
court decisions and adjust legislation to avoid setbacks with constitutional
review.22 In short, the political dimension of constitutional review has been
subject to an intense legal and scholarly debate.
A second audience that a constitutional court must face is other courts,
whose cooperation is needed to effectuate constitutional decisions in ordinary
cases. 23 The relationship between constitutional courts and this judicial audience
has not been subject to extensive analysis. In traditional civil law countries, the
constitutional court has been inserted as a "special court" into a legal system with
an existing hierarchy of courts.24 Though civil law countries usually have
different specialized courts with well-defined jurisdictions (such as administrative,
tax, or labor), these tend to be depoliticized and fairly deferential to the other
branches of government. The constitutional courts, however, appear more
political and qualitatively different from regular courts-hardly surprising since
one goal of the Kelsenian theory was insulation of ordinary courts from politics.25
However, the resulting politicization of the constitutional court may create a
problem in terms of deference by the higher courts. Furthermore, there may be
institutional rivalries between the top courts of ordinary jurisdiction-accustomed
to their superior place in the judicial hierarchy-and the new constitutional court.
This can lead to legal incoherence and gridlock.26
Conflicts between the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction (supreme
court) and the constitutional court have taken place in many countries and usually
arise when the supreme court rejects the authority of the constitutional court in a
20. See generally Barry Friedman, The Politics ofJudicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV.
257, 258 (2005); Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and the
Role of Law: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 273 (B. Weingast & D. Wittman eds., 2006).
21. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 323, 324-26 (1992); see generally Jeffrey R. Lax
& Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court,
23 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 276, 276-301 (2007).
22. See Alec Stone Sweet, Complex Coordinate Construction in France and
Germany, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 206 (C. Neal Tate & Torbj6m
Vallinder eds., 1995) (explaining the judicialization of the legislative process by
consequence of referrals to the court: the constitutional courts are no longer only a negative
legislator; they have and exercise creative legislative powers to recast policies, shape
legislative solutions, and promote more precise terminology).
23. See Garlicki, supra note 3, at 50.
24. See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 13, at 1676-77.
25. Donald P. Kommers, An Introduction to the Federal Court, 2 GERMAN LAW
JOURNAL 30 (2001).
26. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 13, at 1676-77
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particular case.27 These conflicts are typically exacerbated once concrete
constitutional review is fully developed because the interaction between judicial
courts and the constitutional court becomes more intense, and coordination
between the two systems is essential. The natural goal for the constitutional
court in this context is to achieve normative supremacy as the highest court in the
country; in other words, the constitutional court aims to establish a degree of
control over a traditionally depoliticized and deferential judicial system.29
One might expect that the need for constitutional courts to establish and
enhance authority over the judicial courts would create a significant aversion to
dissent. Too much dissent will signal that the law is unsettled and may undermine
the image of the constitutional court as superior. Not surprisingly, constitutional
courts tend to be quite consensual when they are first formed and become
increasingly polarized as time goes by; judicial activism and judicial boldness take
a while to emerge. Constitutional courts that are weak vis-A-vis their supreme
courts, such as those in France and Italy, take a long time to become polarized;
even now France and Italy preserve the fagade of unanimous decisions and do not
publish dissents. Although the long-term trend seems to be toward increasing
polarization, all countries appear to undergo cycles of agreement and discord.
These cycles seem to be related more or less to political instability or changes in
the broader party system (e.g., Germany in the late 1960s, France in the 1980s,
Italy and Portugal in the 1990s, Spain in the 2000s). 30
This article explicitly addresses the interaction between the political and
the judicial dimensions of Kelsenian constitutional courts, focusing on
jurisdictions with a distinct constitutional court sitting alongside a supreme court.
Although there are intra-judicial politics within unified court systems, the problem
is of much less importance because there is no potential conflict over supremacy
between the supreme court and the constitutional court. Furthermore, there is no
obvious difference in institutional structure because all judges in a unified system
are appointed through the same process.
Other literature on constitutional courts has stressed internal incentives
that suppress dissent, such as the value of a pleasant workplace or the costs of
writing a dissent.3 1 This article emphasizes external incentives to eschew dissent,
27. See Garlicki, supra note 3, 54-55.
2 8. Id.
29. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE 19-20, 33-34 (2008) (explaining how constitutional courts pursue a monopoly
over constitutional adjudication and how they search for institutional legitimacy, in
between the judicial and the legislative branches).
30. See Nuno Garoupa, The Politicization of the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts:
Empirical Evidence, in EMPIRICAL JUDICIAL STUDIES 149, 162-83 (KC Huang ed., 2009).
31. Lee Epstein, William Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 101-04 (2011);
Paul H. Edelman et al., Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the Supreme Court: A
Challenge to Attitudinalism (Vanderbilt Law and Econ., Res. Paper No. 10-07, March 30,
2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1564291.
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specifically the desire to provide consistent legal doctrines and obtain the approval
and respect of judicial courts. Moreover, Kelsenian constitutional courts tend to
satisfy the conditions for dissent aversion recognized in recent work, namely, that
they are small and have a heavy workload (unlike the U.S. Supreme Court). 32
The approach we developed to explain the behavior of the Kelsenian
constitutional judges is broadly inspired by the distinction between policy
preferences and dispositional preferences. 33  Policy preferences are associated
with the court's opinion, while dispositional preferences reflect an ideal position
associated with the judge's opinion. Constitutional judges have to trade policy
losses (regardless of whether a judge supports the court's opinion) against
dispositional losses (regardless of whether a judge delivers an opinion consistent
with the most preferred solution). Policy losses are determined by the interaction
between the constitutional and the supreme courts, whereas dispositional losses
are independently determined in each court because they are fully determined by
individual judges. In a broader view, this article belongs to the literature on
strategic judicial decision-making. Rather than relying on mere attitudinal
32. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 31, at 104; Edelman et al., supra note
31, at 1-4. There are other factors besides audience selection that will influence dissent
rates. Docket control, for example, will allow a court to focus on the most difficult and
important cases, which presumably will produce higher rates of dissent. Internal tumover
on a court may matter as well. See Scott R. Meinke & Kevin M. Scott, Collegial Influence
and Judicial Voting Change: The Effect of Membership Change on U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 41 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 909, 910-11 (2007).
33. E.g., Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of
Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review, 14 SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 1, 6-7 (2006).
Consider the following situation: justices on the U.S. Supreme Court decide whether to
grant certiorari based on the extent to which the decision at appeal is closer to their
preferences and if there are reasoned dissents that provide reasons to reverse the decision
on appeal. Court of Appeals judges have an incentive to write dissenting opinions when
they disagree with the majority to force certiorari and increase the chances of a reversal.
The majority at the appellate court has an incentive to search for a compromise to avoid
reasoned dissent and therefore being overturned by the Supreme Court. Strictly speaking,
our framework is different because: 1) there is no appeal from the constitutional court to the
supreme court, 2) there is no certiorari since the principle of legality prevails, and 3) there
is no court hierarchy. Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Komhauser, in Modeling
Collegial Courts III: Adjudication Equilibria (2010) (mimeograph on file with the authors),
show that the final outcome might not be the position of the median justice because it
depends on the entire distribution of ideal points. The model also suggests the importance
of opinion assignment. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-
Dependence, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 169, 170 (1992) (explaining that path-dependence
in collegial courts results from the fact that no single judge controls lawmaking); Lewis A.
Komhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II: Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441
(1992) (pointing out that, due to collective decision-making, case-by-case and issue-by-
issue approaches can result in different outcomes. The development of legal doctrines is
determined crucially by how collegial courts operate).
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inclinations, courts in that literature are modeled as behaving in anticipation of
reaction by the other branches of government (in this case, the supreme court). 34
Our concepts of judicial and political audiences are ideal. Constitutional
courts also interact with other audiences; namely, losing parties (convincing them
of the legitimacy of the unfavorable court decision), legal scholars, and the
general public. By focusing primarily on the political and judicial audiences, we
capture the countervailing forces that constrain or influence a Kelsenian-type
constitutional court.
The next section focuses on the importance of the political and judicial
dimensions in terms of predicting the internal behavior of the Kelsenian
constitutional courts. In Part III, we further discuss some particular institutional
aspects. An empirical analysis of twenty-one jurisdictions follows. We apply our
approach to several representative cases and conclude that there are strong
incentives for internal cohesion within courts as they struggle to influence external
audiences.
II. INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING AND EXTERNAL AUDIENCES
This article centers on the tension between the political and judicial
audiences for constitutional jurisprudence. Most judicial behavior literature
addresses these two sets of constraints on decision-making as implicitly separate,3 5
and the judicial dimension has not attracted the same scholarly attention as the
political dimension. This may be because the literature has been developed most
extensively in the United States, where there is only one highest court. But the
two dimensions are necessarily interrelated and generate a complicated trade-off
between advancing the political agenda of the constitutional court and competing
with the higher courts for judicial supremacy. In some cases, the objectives might
coincide. For example, promoting human rights might simultaneously enhance
the reputation of and respect for the constitutional court with both judicial and
political audiences. In many circumstances, however, these two objectives
conflict.
Some literature has identified the trade-off faced by American courts in
terms of ideological and institutional activism.36 Appealing to a political audience
in our context is a form of ideological activism, in the sense of a propensity to
strike down legislation that is incompatible with the ideology of the court.
34. See Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Strategic Judicial Decision Making 8 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13321, 2007) (arguing that for civil law
jurisdictions, because of a strong and unified polity, courts are inherently more deferent
because exercising independence will trigger political conflict and retaliation); see also
Pablo T. Spiller & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, Toward a Positive Theory of State Supreme
Court Decision Making, 5 BUs. POL. 7, 12 (2003).
35. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
36. See STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & FRANK B. CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL
ACTIvIsM 62-63, 81-82 (2009).
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Interacting with a judicial audience, however, is a specific form of institutional
activism; it has little to do with being deferential to other branches of government
and everything to do with achieving the judicial supremacy of the constitutional
court.
Our approach is to consider the internal decision-making of
constitutional courts confronted with potentially conflicting external audiences.
The key variable is whether decision-making is unified or fragmented, represented
by the existence of separate opinions. Fragmentation, in our view, is a function of
the external audience to which the court is appealing. It is assumed that the court
is composed of individual judges with a range of ideological and legal
preferences. In previous work, we described the task of the court as a whole as a
problem of team production.3 7 Individual judges might prefer to emphasize their
individual contributions to the quality of decision-making, but the court as a
whole will also have a reputation that may require suppressing individual judges'
reputations. This article assumes that the court can resolve internal collective
action problems to the extent it wishes to produce unified opinions, but it also
might prefer to signal the internal preferences of its individual members.
In particular, this article presents two available strategies. On the one
hand, the court can follow a consensual decision-making approach: decisions are
made unanimously after internal negotiation to achieve a consensus. This makes
the constitutional court look like any other judicial higher court. Alternatively, the
court can follow a strategy of fragmentation: cases are decided by majority, with
concurring and dissenting opinions, if allowed, thus revealing, directly or
indirectly, division in the court.38
In a well-established democracy, political fragmentation of the
constitutional court is an impediment to achieving supremacy; 39 a fragmented
court does not look like the prototypical judicial court in civil law systems, where
unanimous decision-making prevails. The top ordinary courts may thus resist
implementing decisions that appear fragmented.
Differences in appointment mechanisms across systems may play a role
in determining the incentives of individual judges to appeal to political or judicial
audiences. The mechanisms of appointments of constitutional courts are typically
37. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the
Organization of the Judiciary, 4 J. COMP. LAW 226, 235-39 (2010).
38. If the procedure does not allow formal dissent, there may be informal
mechanisms for conveying information, such as media coverage, as we see in France or
Italy.
39. Fragmentation in less democratic contexts is a costly signal because it is usually
unwelcomed by the authoritarian regimes, and reprisals might take place. See Gretchen
Helmke & Mitchell S. Sanders, Modeling Motivations: A Method for Inferring Judicial
Goals from Behavior, 68 J. POL. 867, 870 (2006) (defining a policy-seeker court, where the
example is Argentina, although that is not a specialized constitutional court); see also
GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA (2005); Lisa Hilbink, Agents of Anti-Politics: Courts in
Pinochet's Chile, in RULE By LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 102, 104-05 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) (Chile).
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different from the ordinary courts. Constitutional judges belong to a "recognition"
judiciary, appointed at senior stages in their careers, while ordinary judges are
members of a career judiciary, appointed at young ages and spending their whole
lives in the job.40 In many cases, the appointment mechanisms of constitutional
courts will be perceived as more political than those of the supreme court justices.
The mechanisms of judicial appointment also explain division within a
constitutional court. In civil law, there is a general conviction that each legal issue
can have only one correct answer.4 1 Under the conventional theory, the
personality and the ideology of the judge is irrelevant because there is only one
42correct answer. As a consequence, dissenting and concurring opinions are rare
and not welcomed. The practice of allowing dissent in constitutional courts
signals that they are not entirely judicial but at least partly political in character.43
Allowing separate opinions and dispensing with unanimous voting sends a costly
signal, because it means the ideologically important goal of having a single
correct answer is being sacrificed.
Consensus in a constitutional court thus expresses "legal" decision-
making rather than "political" decision-making. This type of legal decision-
making may enhance legitimacy in the eyes of the other higher courts as well as
the general public. At the same time, consensus can deter more explicit
intervention by political actors into the operation of the court. By projecting the
image of legal decision-making, a constitutional court raises the cost (in terms of
public opinion) to political bodies of interference or manipulation. In addition, a
fragmented decision does not usually produce a strong formal constitutional
precedent in the sense of jurisprudence constante or doctrina juridica, and even
less in the common law sense of stare decisis.44 Therefore, a fragmented decision
could leave the constitutional court in a weaker position vis-At-vis the supreme
court, which in most civilian jurisdictions does not allow separate opinions.
40. See generally Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 37.
41. See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 13, at 1673 n.7 (noting that the
disallowance or absence of dissents in many European constitutional courts reflects "the
archaic civil law notion that the law is fixed, clear and discoverable and that all judges do is
discover and apply it").
42. See generally Dieter Grimm, The German Constitutional Court, in How
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS MAKE DECISIONs (Pasquale Pasquino & Barbara Randazzo
eds., 2009).
43. See Victor Ferrer Comella, The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional
Review in a Special Court: Some Thoughts on Judicial Activism, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1703,
1729-30 (2004).
44. Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira & Nuno Garoupa, Stare Decisis and
Certiorari Arrive to Brazil: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, (April 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND
DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974); see
generally INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Neil D. MacCormick &
Robert Summers eds., 1997) (stare decisis).
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At the same time, fragmentation may be desirable from the point of view
of individual judges. A judge appointed by a particular political actor might want
to signal loyalty, even in a minority view in a particular case. A credible ability to
dissent also allows individual judges to push the outcome in a direction that might
eventually be favorable. Fragmentation also can undermine the precedential value
of decisions, which may be desirable when the law is in transition. The political
audience creates pressures for fragmentation, even as the legal audience favors
unanimity.
As a caveat, this discussion applies to "strategic" unanimity and
fragmentation. In many constitutional courts, such as those of France and Italy,
no separate opinions are allowed (in keeping with civil law tradition), so all
decisions are formally unanimous. However, it is well known that even in these
formally consensual courts, there are significant opportunities to expose division
and signal dissent, if needed.45
III. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AND THE CHOICE OF AUDIENCE
While Kelsenian constitutional courts have to consider two different
audiences in exercising constitutional review, there are significant institutional
aspects that determine the balance between the two audiences. This section
addresses these institutional aspects.
A. Abstract and Concrete Review
The first important aspect is the balance of abstract and concrete
review. In abstract review, the main influence of the court is exercised through
screening legislation and shaping policymaking. Naturally, the political audience
is more directly relevant to this activity than the judicial audience. This is not to
say that the other courts are irrelevant. In many cases, the constitutional court
might need the judicial courts to enforce its decisions (particularly if other
branches of government reject the constitutional court's decision to void
45. For example, in the recent case debated by the Italian constitutional court on the
immunity of Prime Minister Berlusconi and other higher authorities of Italy, the Italian
media widely reported that the "unanimous" decision of the court against the prime
minister had six dissents (constitutional judges who supported the prime minister's legal
argument). The recent publication by the French constitutional court of the internal debates
over the landmark cases from 1958 to 1983 also shows the extent of dissent in that court.
See JEAN-PIERRE MACHELON ET AL., LES GRANDES DELIBERATIONS DU CONSEIL
CONSTITUTIONNEL 1958 - 1983 (2009).
46. See SADURSKI, supra note 29, at 68 (observing that legitimacy is politically more
complicated in abstract rather than concrete review, even if the court has undisputed formal
legitimacy).
Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts
legislation).7 Nevertheless, the judicial audience is relatively more important in
concrete review cases because implementation often (though not always) requires
cooperation between the constitutional court and regular courts.48
Clearly, concrete review blurs the separation between the constitutional
court and the rest of the judiciary, whether it is initiated by incidental referrals
from ordinary judges or direct constitutional complaints. It induces the
constitutional court to participate in the resolution of individual cases, either
substituting or complementing ordinary dispute resolution. The constitutional
court substitutes for ordinary courts when it decides cases that would otherwise be
within the judicial province; it complements them when it serves to resolve
constitutional questions that are then implemented by ordinary courts. Neither
function was intended by the original Kelsenian model. (Apparently, Kelsen was
opposed to any form of concrete review by constitutional courts.) 49  The
consequence is a less transparent delimitation of jurisdictions and the emergence
of conflicts of competence between the constitutional court and the higher judicial
courts.o
Abstract review, in particular, preventive or ex ante promulgation,
provides a weak mechanism for a constitutional court to try to condition other
courts. There is no obvious relation between the review of legislation in the
abstract and the work of regular courts. However, given the importance of the
constitutional court, creative techniques can be developed to achieve influence
over ordinary judges. For example, the French idea of "conforming
interpretation," although dependent on the voluntary compliance of other courts, is
still conceptually influential;5 1 yet courts that lack abstract review (e.g., Italy)
have a reduced ability to shape legislative outcomes and consequently have less
political influence. 52
The possibility of a conflict between the two major court systems has
substantive implications. First, it puts pressure on constitutional judges to achieve
a coherent body of constitutional jurisprudence or doctrines to convince the
ordinary court of the legal integrity of constitutional decision-making.5 3
Therefore, it transforms the nature and scope of constitutional review by
demanding apolitical decision-making. The constitutional court must be a better
legal craftsman when it relies on ordinary courts to implement its decisions.
47. ToM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 134-37 (2003) (on court
relations in Taiwan).
48. In Chile, for example, until 2005, the Constitutional Court exercised abstract
review while the Supreme Court performed concrete review. Royce Carrol & Lydia Tiede
Beshear, Judicial Behavior on the Chilean Supreme Court, 8 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 856, 860
(2011).
49. KELSEN, supra note 6, at 246.
50. See Garlicki, supra 3, at 65.
51. Id. at 62.
52. See Stone Sweet, supra note 4, at 88.
53. In the limit, developing a court-made constitution that supplements or even
replaces the original text. See, e.g., Garlicki, supra note 3, at 68.
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Second, conflict or competition among the courts increases the political value of
constitutional review because it might provide an indirect mechanism for
influencing both policy and the judiciary-particularly if politicians use the
constitutional court to interfere with the ordinary courts. The natural inclination
for the constitutional court is to expand its reach into areas that make it more
politically relevant, one example being the progressive constitutionalization of
private law in several jurisdictions. 54 Third, the balance of power is shaped by the
constitution itself; that is, the extent to which a constitutional court is conceived
not only as a negative legislator, but also as a positive legislator with formidable
powers of statutory interpretation.ss As a positive legislator, the court strikes laws
and actively interprets the conditions under which they can be implemented. If a
constitutional court has a role as a positive legislator, it can act either as a
counterweight against the parliamentary majority or as a substitute if no stable
parliamentary majority exists.
Concrete review is not immune from politics. However, the capacity to
advance an ideological agenda through concrete review is more limited than
through abstract review. Concrete review requires the constitutional court to
develop specific legal reasoning in terms of rhetoric and judicial syntax that
makes it similar to a decision of a regular court while at the same time advancing
a particular ideological agenda. Because regular courts do not engage in abstract
review, the constitutional court is not under pressure to use similar specific legal
reasoning in those cases.
Another type of review is preventive (abstract) review, in which a court
blocks unconstitutional policies before implementation. Whereas concrete review
"judicializes" constitutional courts, preventive review has the opposite effect.
Preventive review makes a constitutional court less judicial and more political-
indeed legislative. Constitutional courts as idealized by Kelsen are political in
nature, notwithstanding their judicial form and procedure.58 Hence, they should
not be part of the traditional judiciary or court structure. Constitutional law is
political in nature, and constitutional adjudication is a necessary part of the
political process. Therefore, the distinction between law and politics is not likely
to be clear in constitutional review.59
The double role as a political and a judicial institution (not supported by
the original negative legislator model, but now pursued by all existing
constitutional courts) creates an inevitable "judicialization" of politics for three
54. Rogdrio B. Arantes, Constitutionalism, the Expansion of Justice and the
Judicialization ofPolitics in Brazil, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA
(Rachel Sieder et al. eds., 2005).
55. See Leslie Turano, Spain: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: The Struggle for
Jurisdiction Between the Tribunal Constitucional and the Tribunal Supremo, 4 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 151, 152-53 (2006).
56. See Stone Sweet, supra note 4, at 42.
57. Id.
58. Garoupa, supra note 30, at 149; STONE SWEET, supra note 5, at 135-37.
59. STONE SWEET, supra note 5, at 136.
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reasons. First, as a consequence of the constitutional court's particular
institutional position, its tendency to expand its institutional power affects the
delicate balance between judicial and political structures. As the court becomes
more politically involved, other political agents will become aware of it and will
respond. Second, the expansion of institutional power and influence naturally
generates conflict, which could undermine the appropriate framework for the
institutional development of democracy. Third, political diffusion makes the role
of a constitutional court more important, as disparate political groups seek a third
party to resolve disputes. The inevitable "judicialization of politics" necessarily
politicizes the court. Hence, politics inside the constitutional court becomes
unavoidably contaminated by party politics. The stakes are simply too relevant
and important for political parties not to interfere. 60
At the same time, the ongoing skirmishes between the two major courts
can contaminate the supreme court, leading it to depart from traditional decision-
making, including the style and content of decisions. In Europe, for instance,
literal statutory interpretation has given way to general principles of law invented
and created by courts in Europe.6' France serves as a particularly striking
example.62 Traditionally, the legal authority of the French higher courts insisted
on judicial deference to the legislative and executive branches and favored
administrative review of legality and good governance over judicial review of
constitutionality. 63 The slow development of constitutional principles applied to
individual rights and liberties by the French Conseil Constitutionnel after the
1970s, coupled with other external factors, resulted in significant changes in the
legal culture of the French courts.M Recently, the French higher courts have
shifted toward the use of fundamental principles at the expense of code law. 65
This trend was partially a response to enhanced individual capacity in
participating in the judicial process because of the expansion of individual rights.
Gradually, the higher courts have been more frequently asked to deliberate and
decide these (largely uncodified) general principles, which naturally affect public
policy.66  Although this shift has been criticized by many French legal
commentators for undermining legal certainty, this form of judicial activism by
the Cour de Cassation (the equivalent of the supreme court) and the Conseil
60. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of
Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93, 98 (2008) (explaining the political
consequences of systematic, unwelcome judgments concerning contentious political issues
and how that creates unstable courts).
61. ROBERT ALExY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 2 (1998).
62. See MICHEL DE S.-O.-I.'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE 271-72 (2009).
63. Id.
64. Id. (discussing the external European influence on imposing "judicial review"
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d'tat (the top administrative court) responds to the activist approach taken by the
Conseil Constitutionnel since the early 1980s.
B. Opportunity Structure and Other Factors
A constitutional court is not likely to be either fragmented or consensual
all of the time. In that sense, we expect a "mixed" strategy that responds to the
relative importance of both political and judicial audiences in any given context.
The implementation of a mixed strategy will depend on a number of factors.
One immediate aspect to consider is the opportunity for exercising
constitutional review. This is partly a function of institutional design. Political
actors (other branches of government, parliamentary opposition groups) usually
trigger abstract review, and therefore the court has little control over these
occurrences. 67 As for concrete review, there are different possibilities. Generally,
private actors and citizens generate direct constitutional complaints. In many
countries, however, ordinary citizens can access the constitutional court only
through incidental referrals by ordinary courts in the context of concrete cases.
Presumably, docket control could increase the collegiality of the court
and therefore promote consensus. 69 However, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court,
most constitutional courts have little discretionary control over their dockets and
lack the ability to decline appeals. 70 Political actors influence and determine a
constitutional court's agenda, in particular when abstract review plays an
important role.
A second important aspect is the extension of jurisdiction of the
constitutional court beyond its constitutional mandate.7' Formally, the extent of
constitutional court review is explicitly defined by a constitution, but a
constitutional court engaging in maximizing supremacy will use case law to
increase its jurisdiction. It also could influence the other branches to promote
constitutional amendments that further consolidate its power. For example, the
inevitable instability of federal arrangements might empower the constitutional
court to interfere in areas that were not anticipated in earlier periods. (The role of
the European Court of Justice in the European Union is a good example.)
In many cases, the enlargement of constitutional law will result in clashes
with the higher courts. Formally, most legal systems empower the constitutional
67. STONE, supra note 4, at 233-34 (describing expansion of jurisdiction of French
Conseil Constitutionnel in 1974 to include parliamentary minorities).
68. This is the Italian model. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional
Adjudication, Italian Style, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 294 (Tom Ginsburg
ed., 2012).
69. See Meinke & Scott, supra note 32, at 911-12.
70. STONE SWEET, supra note 5, at 46.
71. For example, Brazil has a constitutional court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) and an
infraconstitutional court (Supremo Tribunal de Justiga). The hierarchical relationship
between these two courts is established by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.
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court to decide which matters are constitutional. 72 The so-called Kompetenz-
Kompetenz question (the power to decide one's own power) has been resolved
fairly early in most constitutional systems. While one might think that conflicts
should not exist, at least in theory, such a formalistic approach ignores the
practicalities of judicial decision-making and disregards the ingenious abilities of
higher courts to undermine formal solutions to potential conflicts.
A constitutional court's composition is another relevant variable that
affects the extent to which it cares about achieving supremacy. Limited tenure
certainly reduces incentives for investments in court reputation while increasing
concern about outside employment after judges' terms in the court are finished.
Career magistrates might be less inclined to sacrifice the influence and power of
the supreme court in favor of their own employment security because they will
presumably return to the ordinary courts after their term is over. On the other
hand, life tenure may foster more judicial concern about achieving supremacy and
increase the willingness of constitutional judges to trade off short-term goals
against future gains.
At the same time, court turnover affects the ability to generate consensus.
It could be that there is a period of acclimation, during which new constitutional
judges avoid confrontation and are more willing to sacrifice ideological
preferences.73 However, as previously argued, consensus requires stability in the
composition of the court, which is likely to be compatible with high turnover
rates. This effect is likely to be more relevant if the appointment process is
politically divisive.
In short, institutional factors related to constitutional court design and
practice will naturally influence how it interacts with political and legal audiences,
and thus the degree of fragmentation on the court. Judges who come from the
ordinary courts may favor consensual judicial approaches, but frequent turnover
will encourage fragmentation. Abstract review tends toward the political and thus
fragmentation, while docket control may push toward consensus. The particular
configurations vary and should impact the frequency of dissent.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This section presents quantitative evidence from more than twenty
Kelsenian constitutional courts (including France). Table 1 summarizes the
findings in terms of incidence of conflicts between constitutional and supreme
courts (as reported in the news media and in legal journals) and the stability of the
72. See, e.g., LUIGI CORRIAS, THE PASSIVITY OF LAW: COMPETENCE AND
CONSTITUTION ON THE EUROPEAN COURT 23 (2011) (German Constitutional Court
exercising Kompetenz-Kompetenz about what matters are constitutional).
73. See Saul Brenner & Timothy M. Hagle, Opinion Writing and the Acclimation
Effect, 18 POL. BEHAV. 235, 236 (1996).
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court majority (as measured by a stable allocation of seats to political parties
according to expert assessment).74
Table 1: Conflict and Stability in Constitutional Courts
Stable Party Variable Party
Composition Composition
Germany (after 1970s), France,* Chile, Korea,
Austria, Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Low Incidence Portugal, Taiwan (before Latvia, Ukraine
of Conflicts 2000s), Hungary,
Lithuania, Turkey, South
Africa
Germany (before 1970s), Spain, Italy, Colombia,
ofConlidce Poland, Russia Czech Republic, Taiwan
(after 2000s)
* Ex ante promulgation abstract review only (before 2009).
This article predicts that there is an important relationship between court
stability and conflict between the constitutional court and the supreme court.
Conflicts are likely to occur between the constitutional and the supreme courts
when there is court instability, all else equal. This section provides evidence that
supports our hypothesis and discusses several illustrative examples.
A. Preliminary Quantitative Evidence
We have coded stability and conflict in the courts with two dummies,
where one represents instability in the allocation of seats on the court and the
other the existence of occasional confrontation between the supreme court and the
constitutional court. Our hypothesis is that there is a positive correlation between
these two dummies. A correlation of 0.3105 is found between these two variables,
as we can see from Table 2. If we exclude France (the only jurisdiction with only
abstract review and therefore a constitutional court with less direct influence over
the local supreme courts), the correlation increases to 0.3553."
74. In both cases, we have relied on previous empirical work by the authors and a
review of secondary sources. We operationalize stability by considering whether there
have been any reported conflicts over appointments or changes to the mechanism of
appointment during the period under review.
75. For these calculations, we have excluded Germany (before 1970s) and Taiwan
(before 2000s).
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Table 2: Correlations
Conflict Instability Rule of Law Population DPpc
Conflict 1.00
Instability 0.3105 1.00
Rule of Law -0.2325 0.0115 1.00
Population 0.3482 -0.1719 -0.5097 1.00 ______
GDPpc -0.0504 -0.0594 0.7105 -0.1078 1.00
Other control variables include the rule of law indicator of the World
Bank for 2009," GDP per capita for 2009, and population estimation for 2009.
Our estimation approach is a probit model, where the dependent variable is the
existence of dissent, and the independent variables are instability of the court
majority and the control variables. We ran the probit regressions with and without
France in the sample. In both regressions, the coefficient for instability is
statistically significant and has the correct (positive) sign. The probability of
occasional conflicts between supreme and constitutional courts increases by
56.9% (with France) and 41.5% (without France) when the court majority is
instable. Table 3 presents the results.
Table 3: Regression Analysis
Probit Conflict Probit Conflict
(Excluding France)
Pseudo R2 0.233 0.338











Robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1, **p<0.(5, ***p<0.01
The empirical evidence seems to support our hypothesis. However, it is
clear that the sample is small, and the measures of stability and conflict are crude.
Unfortunately, there is no readily available data set that allows the development of
76. Worldwide Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/
govemance/wgi/index.asp (last visited Dec. 31, 2011).
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a more sophisticated empirical test because constitutional courts do not uniformly
report dissent rates. A more informed empirical assessment requires a better
institutional analysis than a crude cross-country correlation.
B. Stable Court Majority and Low Incidence of Conflict
1. Germany
The Federal Constitutional Court was established in 1951." It is
composed of sixteen judges divided into two eight-judge senates, based in
specialized areas of constitutional law. 8 The sixteen constitutional judges are
appointed by the parliament--eight by the lower house (the Bundestag) and eight
by the upper house (the Bundesrat).79  As a consequence of the appointment
mechanism, which requires a supermajority (two-thirds) in the federal parliament,
there is a need for a consensus between major political parties.80 Over time, a
norm has developed so that constitutional judges are effectively appointed on
party tickets without public hearings.81  The supermajority requirement has
created a de facto quota system;82 the two major parties divide the seats, with the
occasional appointment of a judge from one of the minor parties to reflect
parliamentary composition and ongoing governmental coalitions.83  As a
consequence, we can conclude that the majority in the German court is reasonably
stable.
Dissenting opinions were traditionally regarded as inappropriate by
German constitutional judges, who were trained in the civil law orthodoxy of a
single correct answer to a legal dispute.84 Dissent was formally introduced in
77. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 15.
78. One senate deals with basic rights, whereas the other senate looks at abstract
review and major constitutional disputes. The full court exists but plays a secondary role.
See Alfred Rinken, The Federal Constitutional Court and the German Political System, in
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN COMPARISON: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE
GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 55, 72 (Ralf Rogowski & Thomas Gawron
eds., 2002).
79. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 17-18.
80. See GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY
83 (2005).
8 1. See Rainier Nickel, The German Federal Constitutional Court: Present State,
Future Challenges, in BUILDING THE UK's NEW SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 175, 183-84 (Andrew Le Sueur ed., 2004) (arguing those
package deals lack transparency); Grimm, supra note 42 (arguing that such package deals
eliminate the possibility of electing extremists to the court and therefore reduce
polarization).
82. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 89 (1976); VANBERG, supra note 80, at 83-85.
83. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 22; VANBERG, supra note 80, at 83, 85.
84. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 37 (2d ed. 1997).
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1970. In the early 1970s, however, many constitutional judges regretted the
move, viewing it as proving the court to be more political than other German
courts. Many constitutional judges, in particular career magistrates, refused to
file dissenting opinions.
The relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the rest of
the courts has not always been smooth, but, overall, explicit conflicts are rare.
Cooperation is required to effectuate constitutional decisions; constitutional
questions that arise in ordinary disputes are referred to the Constitutional Court
through the incidental reference mechanism, after which the interpretation of the
Constitution is sent back to the originating court to apply.88 Although the German
Constitutional Court was inserted into a complex structure headed by five
supreme courts, the supreme courts were in a weak position in the early 1950s
because they failed to oppose the Nazi regime and enforced despicable Nazi
laws.89 The new German Constitutional Court was untainted by any Nazi past and
was perceived as the guarantor of the new democratic regime.90 As anticipated by
our thesis, the court focused its early decisions on the political audience, deciding
many important issues about the political process, and achieving administrative
and budgetary autonomy in 1952. Confrontation with the other courts emerged
later.91
By the late 1950s, there were some skirmishes over procedural rules. For
example, the German Constitutional Court decided that the supreme courts could
not submit their own opinions about constitutionality in the context of incidental
review and later abolished their participation in judicial referrals. 92 The supreme
courts protested, but there was more to come. In landmark decisions in 1957 and
1958, the court extended a general right to "individual liberty," thereby effectively
subjecting all private law to constitutional review.93 This stripped the supreme
courts of exclusive jurisdiction over many areas of the law. A clear refusal by
regular courts to follow the doctrines of the court is rare given the status of the
German Constitutional Court, but legal scholars have identified areas where
divergences have been taking place (e.g., the "expropriation" clause or
85. VANBERG, supra note 80, at 91.
86. See Grimm, supra note 42, at 52. In the early 1950s, the opposing Social
Democrats favored the use of dissenting opinions, while the governing Christian Democrats
opposed it. Consistent with our prediction, the movement for dissenting opinions emerged
in the late 1960s once the German Constitutional Court was well established, strong enough
to face the political audience and sufficiently credible in the eyes of the other courts (and of
the general public). Id.
87. Id. at 52-53.
88. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I art. 100(1) (Ger.).
89. KOMMERS, supra note 10, at 5-10.
90. See Garlicki, supra note 3, at 50.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 51-53.
93. Id. at 51.
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compliance with length of detention). 94 Occasionally, one of the supreme courts
is more vocal against doctrines developed by the German Constitutional Court
(e.g., the supreme court in civil and criminal matters, the Bundesgerichtshof, has
been somewhat resistant), but by and large, they appear to accommodate them.95
In fact, some legal scholars argue that the situation in Germany is less
confrontational than in other jurisdictions.96 Our approach attributes this to the
historically weak position of the supreme courts, both in terms of their limited
jurisdiction (each of them vis-A-vis the other supreme courts) and the Nazi period.
On the other hand, the stabilized political appointment processes in the German
Constitutional Court have allowed doctrines to develop that emphasize the judicial
role over short-run ideological gains. Stability has led to effective subordination
of the ordinary courts.
2. Portugal
The Portuguese Constitutional Court was inaugurated in 1982 (after the
first constitutional reform) and exercises constitutional review according to the
1976 Constitution.98 There are thirteen constitutional judges; ten are elected by
Parliament with a two-thirds majority, and the remaining three are appointed by
94. Id. at 53. See also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional
Court] Dec. 6, 2005, 1 BVERFGE 1905/02, 2005 (Ger.).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Another example, in the context of the German-speaking world, is Austria. The
fourteen Austrian constitutional judges are chosen by the federal government (President,
Vice-President and six members) and both chambers of Parliament (three members each),
although the President of Austria technically makes all appointments. The appointment
mechanism has resulted in a de facto quota system allocation of seats. Judges are
appointed for life (subject to mandatory retirement age). Although a matter of discussion
since Germany changed its policy in 1971, separate opinions are not allowed. The Austrian
Constitutional Court has engaged in controversial decisions, but there are few instances of
skirmishes with regular courts. See Alexander Somek, Constitutional Theory as a Problem
of Constitutional Law: On the Constitutional Court's Total Revision of Austrian
Constitutional Law, 32 ISR. L. REv. 567, 569 (1998). Until the 1970s, the conservatives
had a solid court majority. Then, one "conservative" seat was taken by the social-
democrats under the Kreisky government, saving the new legislation promoted by the
social-democrats but provoking the resignation of the president of the court in the mid-
1970s. In 2003, the liberals got a "social democratic seat" (first ever of a third party). Such
move has solidified the current conservative majority. There have been sporadic conflicts,
mainly between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, for
example, concerning expulsion of a foreigner (1980) or freedom of religion with respect to
Jehovah's Witnesses (1987). See MANFRED STELZER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF AUSTRIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2011).
98. Constituipto da Repdblica Portuguesa [Constitution] arts. 221-224 (Port.).
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the elected judges.99 In practice, the elected judges are chosen from a list of
names negotiated by the parliamentary leadership of the main parties.'o A de
facto quota system allocates party seats to the major parties,' 0 thus explaining the
stability of the court majority. There are six right-wing judges and six left-wing
judges, and the thirteenth is a person perceived to be politically neutral.1 02
Constitutional judges are elected for nonrenewable terms of nine years. (The
mandate was six years and renewable for a second term before the 1997
reform.)10 3 The political structure of the court is thus fairly stable and predictable.
There have been very few conflicts between the Portuguese
Constitutional Court and the Portuguese Supreme Court. This is partly due to the
hybrid system by which lower courts can perform constitutional review in
concrete cases (a feature of U.S. jurisprudence that reached Portugal through the
1891 Brazilian Constitution).104 Under our approach, the stability of the court
majority might have helped the constitutional judges to defer particular
ideological gains when exercising concrete review, focusing on consolidating the
position of the court vis-A-vis the ordinary courts (thus entertaining many appeals
on constitutional issues from lower courts), while using abstract review to signal
party allegiance.' 05
C. Moving from Low Conflict to High Conflict: Taiwan as a Hybrid Case
The Republic of China (Taiwan) Constitution is one of the oldest
currently in force, dating from its adoption on the mainland in 1947.0 Similarly.
the Taiwanese Constitutional Court (known as the Grand Justices of the Judicial
99. Brent Wible, Filibuster vs. Supermajority Rule: From Polarization to a
Consensus-and Moderation-Forcing Mechanism for Judicial Confirmations, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 923, 960 (2005).
100. See Sofia Amaral Garcia, Nuno Garoupa & Veronica Grembi, Judicial
Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of
Portugal, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 381, 387 (2009).
10 1. Id.
102. Id. at 388-89 n.28.
103. Id. at 386.
104. Id. at 385.
105. For example, in an important case (STC 810/93, of December 7, 1993), the
Portuguese Constitutional Court decided that the judicial doctrines produced by the
Supreme Court, even those "with general obligatory force," as stated by the civil code, are
not a source of law. Therefore, such judicial doctrines are not binding; they do not
establish horizontal or vertical precedent. However, in a concession to the Supreme Court,
the Portuguese Constitutional Court recommended that the lower courts consider judicial
doctrines for sake of legal stability and certainty. See VICTOR FERRERES COMELLA,
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 173
(2009).
106. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 172 (2009).
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Yuan) predates almost all the other specialized Kelsenian constitutional courts. 07
Although composition and jurisdiction have been reformed in the last fifty years,
the Taiwanese Constitutional Court has persevered throughout the authoritarian
period and the more recent emerging democracy. 08 The age and role of the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court make it quite different from other constitutional
courts.
Before 2003, the court was composed of seventeen judges who were
appointed by the President with approval of the Control Yuan (1948-1992) or the
National Assembly (1992-2000) and served for renewable terms of nine years.109
Since 2003, the number of constitutional judges has been reduced to fifteen." 0
They are now appointed by the President with the majority consent of the
Legislative Yuan and serve nonrenewable terms of eight years."I
Dissent was unusual in the authoritarian period.112 From the transition to
democracy in the late 1980s to present day, there have been three presidents, two
affiliated with the traditional KMT (Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party)
and one supported by the opposition DPP. " The disproportional influence of the
KMT appointed judges is clear, although the KMT should not be mistaken as a
monolithic party. The court majority has been stable even after the election of
DPP President Chen Shui-bian.
Taiwan's court exercises exclusively abstract power: it requires ordinary
courts to refer cases to it in concrete cases, and decisions in such cases require
implementation by the ordinary courts.114 Until 1993, this referral power was
concentrated in the Supreme Court of the Republic of China and the Supreme
Administrative Court, as lower courts could not refer cases." 5 Furthermore, in the
initial design of the Constitutional Court, it was not seen as having the power to
review Supreme Court decisions that might potentially conflict with the
Constitution.'16 Just as democratization was beginning in 1986, the Constitutional
Court moved to assert jurisdiction over Supreme Court decisions." 7 It later ruled
that lower court justices could refer cases directly to the Constitutional Court,
empowering the lower ranks of the judicial hierarchy and securing supremacy
over the Supreme Court." 8 With the need to communicate unity to the judicial
107. GINSBURG, supra note 47, at 112.
108. Id.
109. See Nuno Garoupa, Veronica Grembi & Shirley Lin, Explaining Constitutional
Review in New Democracies: The Case of Taiwan, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 5 (2011).
110. Minguo Xianfa art. 1-11 (2000) (Taiwan).
111. David Law & Wen-chen Chang, The Limits of Transnational Judicial Dialogue,
86 WASH. L. REv. 523, 545 (2011).
112. GINSBURG, supra note 47, at 128.
113. In particular, Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000, KMT); Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008,
DPP); Ma Ying-jeou (since 2008, KMT).
114. GINSBURG, supra note 47, at 135.
115. Id at 138.
116. Id. at 135.
117. Interpretation No. 242 (1989); see GINSBURG, supra note 47, at 136.
118. See GINSBURG, supra note 47, at 124-28.
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audience resolved, the court became more involved in political matters,
adjudicating major policy questions.'1 Dissent rates increased from a low base,
though the court still insists on unity in certain important cases.120 The political
audience became primary.
Taiwan represents a kind of hybrid case for our theory. As the
Constitutional Court began to become more powerful in a democratic era,
conflicts emerged with the Supreme Court. Furthermore, with an increased
profile, the political audience has become more important, and the court has
fragmented. Interestingly, the conflicts preceded fragmentation on the court, or at
least occurred simultaneously, resulting in a sequence different from those
observed in other cases.
D. Unstable Court Majority and Hi2h Incidence of Conflict
1. Italy
The Italian Constitutional Court was established in 1955. Three different
political actors appoint five judges each, for a total of fifteen judges. The five
judges appointed by Parliament require a supermajority (in a joint vote of the two
chambers, two-thirds majority for the first three rounds and a three-fifths majority
thereafter). 12i As expected, this has resulted in a structural arrangement that
corresponds to a de facto quota system. However, the five judges appointed by
the President and the five judges elected by the judiciary disrupt the existence of a
stable court majority.
Several mechanisms have been implemented to avoid explicit party
alignments, including the writing of single opinions, secret votes, and the
disallowance of concurring or dissenting opinions. 122 The confrontation between
the Constitutional Court and the other top courts in Italy has been widely
documented. 23 The main source for the difficult relationship between the Italian
Constitutional Court and the regular courts is the process of submitting "legal
questions." Once a regular court submits a "question," the court decides the
constitutional interpretation; the ruling is an important part of law, which the
ordinary court applies to the case.124 The Constitutional Court has developed
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Judicial Yaun Interpertation No. 627 (June 5, 2007), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=627 (discussing
former President Chen Shui-bian's immunity from prosecution).
121. Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 68, at 294.
122. Id.
123. See J. H. Merryman & V. Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution and
Cassation in Italy, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 665, 665-86 (1967); MARY L. VOLCANSEK,
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY 100 (2000); Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 68, at
294.
124. See Garlicki, supra note 3, at 54-57.
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particular techniques of interpretation that occasionally collide with doctrines
developed by the ordinary courts.'25 There were major clashes between the Italian
Constitutional Court and the Italian Court of Cassation in 1965, with more
skirmishes following in the 1970s and in the 1980s.126 Recent confrontations have
taken place in the area of criminal law and criminal procedure, with the Court of
Cassation refusing to apply interpretations from the Constitutional Court. 27
The difficult coexistence of top courts in Italy is easily explained by our
analysis. The dockets of the Constitutional Court rely heavily on questions
interposed by regular courts.' 28 Hence, there is a direct relationship that creates
tension because Constitutional Court decisions immediately affect the outcome of
the cases heard by the regular courts, limiting their influence. The application of
law is still a monopoly of the regular courts, so the Constitutional Court has to
convince regular courts that a cooperative mode is better for all. The importance
of the judicial audience explains the behavior of this court. Instability in the
composition of the Constitutional Court has limited its ability to effectively
discipline the lower courts, and conflict has continued.
2. Spain
The Spanish Constitutional Court was established by the 1978
Constitution, which introduced a parliamentary regime under a constitutional
monarchy after almost forty years of dictatorship led by General Franco.' 29 The
Court is composed of twelve judges. They are nominated for nine-year,
nonrenewable terms. The appointment mechanism is mixed, involving the
government, the two chambers of Parliament, and the judicial council, and has
diluted the possibility of a de facto quota system. 30 Significant skirmishes
between the Spanish Constitutional Court and the Spanish Supreme Court have
been widely documented.131 Tension becomes evident because the Spanish
Constitutional Court guides lower courts in interpreting laws that affect individual
rights and liberties.' 32
More recently, the Constitutional Court, due to its internal polarization,
was unable to decide on the constitutionality of the Catalan Constitution, further
125. Id. at 54.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Tania Groppi, The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a 'Multilevel System' of
Constitutional Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Andrew
Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).
129. Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gomez Pomar & Veronica Grembi, Judging Under
Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Review Vote in the Spanish
Constitutional Court, 27 J. L. EcON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2013).
130. Id.
131. See Turano, supra note 55, at 151-52.
132.Id.
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harming its reputation.133 At the same time, conflict with the Spanish Supreme
Court has continued unabated.134 The resulting loss of credibility of the Spanish
Constitutional Court has been widely discussed by the media.'3 5 Again, internal
fragmentation harms the external supremacy of the Constitutional Court.
3. Korea
The Korean Constitutional Court was established in late 1988 as part of
the constitutional establishment of Korea's Sixth Republic.136  Though the
constitutional drafters expected a relatively quiescent institution, the court has
become the embodiment of the new democratic constitutional order of Korea.' 3 7
The court consists of nine justices who serve six-year renewable terms, now
staggered so that justices are appointed in sets. The Supreme Court, the National
Assembly, and the President each appoint three justices.138 Consequently, there is
no stable majority.
The Korean Constitutional Court has engaged in occasional struggles
with the Supreme Court over jurisdiction, caused by the fact that the
Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction over challenges to the constitutionality of
administrative action.'3 9 The distinction between administrative and legislative
interpretation is not as clear or as straightforward as might be imagined. The
question of the constitutionality of an administrative regulation frequently requires
interpretation of relevant statutory text.140 A restrictive interpretation of a statute
will tend to void, on constitutional grounds, administrative action that relies on a
broad reading of the statute. So the Constitutional Court is able to shape the
Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations if it issues a decision on the statute
prior to administrative action. However, if it acts second, it cannot always do so.
133. The Estatut de Catalunya was approved by the Spanish Parliament in 2005, and
after a referendum in the region in 2006, it had to wait until July 2010 for the Spanish
Constitutional Court's decision (after a petition from the conservative party that opposed
this law).
134. For example, consider a recent case absolving two prominent Spanish financiers
of a white-collar crime against the interpretation of the Spanish Supreme Court on the
statute of limitation for criminal offenses. S.T.C., Feb. 20, 2008 (S.T.C., No. 29) (Spain),
available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/jurisprudencia/Pages/Sentencia.aspx?
cod=9455.
135. See EL PAIS, http://www.elpais.com/todo-sobre/organismo/TC/Tribunall
Constitucional/58/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2011).
136. Ginsburg, supra note 47, at 207.
137. Tom Ginsburg, The Constitutional Court and the Judicialization of Korean
Politics, in NEW COURTS IN ASIA 145 (Andrew Harding et al. eds., 2009).
138. GINSBURG, supra note 47, at 220.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 239-41 (describing cases involving tax and judicial scriveners law).
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Ordinary court decisions are not explicitly included within the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court,141 yet rulings of the court on
unconstitutionality are to be respected by ordinary courts, other state agencies, and
local government bodies.142 This means that while ordinary courts must abide by
Constitutional Court decisions, they are themselves the sole determiners of what
those decisions require. Ordinary courts cannot be corrected by the Constitutional
Court for failure to apply its decision correctly. Rather, the Supreme Court is the
sole body able to overrule lower court decisions. Therefore, much is at stake on
the question of whether Supreme Court decisions can be appealed to the
Constitutional Court.
In 1990, the Constitutional Court unilaterally decided that it had implied
jurisdiction over administrative regulations issued pursuant to statutes and that the
assignment of administrative review in Article 107(2) to the ordinary courts was
not exclusive.143  In response to that decision, the Supreme Court issued a
statement to all ordinary judges condemning the Constitutional Court decision and
stating that it had "gone beyond its domain."l 44 In 1995, the Constitutional Court
declared a tax law partially unconstitutional and dictated that it could be applied
only if given a particular narrow interpretation.145 The Supreme Court responded
that, because the Constitutional Court had no authority over ordinary court
judgments, its decision could be taken only as an expression of opinion regarding
constitutionality and had no binding force over ordinary courts. 146
In December 1997, the original petitioner again sought relief from the
Constitutional Court, and the court obliged by annulling the Supreme Court
judgment, even though it had no explicit power to do so in the Constitutional
Court Act.147 The court also voided that portion of the Constitutional Court Act
that excluded ordinary court decisions from constitutional review, saying that
Constitutional Court decisions must be binding on all.148 The Supreme Court
responded by holding a press conference, asserting that it would reply through a
judgment. 149 Subsequently, the Constitutional Court continued to consider
141. DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 111(1) (S. Kor.).
142. Constitutional Court Act No. 10546, Apr. 5, 2011, art. 47(1) (S. Kor.).
143. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 89Hun-Mal78, Oct. 15, 1990, (2 KCCR, 365)
(S. Kor.). Article 107(2) reads, "The Supreme Court shall have the power to make a final
review of the constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regulations or
dispositions, when their constitutionality or legality is a prerequisite to a trial." HUNBEOB
art. 107(2).
144. See James M. West & Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitutional Court of the Republic
of Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudence at the Vortex, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 114
(1992).




149. This high-profile conflict led the Korea Herald to call for legislative resolution of
the problem: "This complicated and subtle conflict between the two supreme juridical
bodies calls for an intervention of the President and the National Assembly which can
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ordinary court judgments in certain cases, and it now appears that the theory of the
Constitutional Court has been accepted de facto.
4. Colombia
The Constitutional Court of Colombia was established in 1992. It is
composed of nine judges serving eight-year terms.150 The president, the Supreme
Court of Colombia, and the Colombian Supreme Administrative Court each
propose three candidates to be selected by the Senate.1 5 1  The resulting
composition of the court is not ideologically stable and has led to well-
documented conflicts between the Colombian Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court. 152  Because the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative
Court (Consejo de Estado) traditionally rendered res judicata rulings (thus without
any revision or appellate process available), conflicts of power were triggered
after the new constitutional mandate was in place. 153  The bolder doctrines
developed by the Colombian Constitutional Court on personal rights conflicted
with the approaches taken by the higher courts. 154 The inevitable antagonism
between these institutions led to legislation in 2000 to subordinate the higher
courts to the Constitutional Court. 155 This is an example of how the political
audience ultimately had to intervene to ensure supremacy of the constitutional
court after costly conflict.
exercise their legislative prerogatives toward illuminating the balance of power and
division of labour between the two highest courts." Editorial, KOREA HERALD, Dec. 30,
1997.
150. Luz Estella Nagle, Evolution of the Colombian Judiciary and the Constitutional
Court, 6 IND. INT'L COMP. L. REv. 59, 81 (1995).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Martha 1. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court: The Gender
Jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 253,
322 (1998).
153. Id.
154. Alicia E. Yamin & Oscar Parra-Vera, How Do Courts Set Health Policy? The
Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 6 PLoS MED. 147 (2009); Maria Paula
Saffon, Can Constitutional Courts Be Counterhegemonic Powers vis-a-vis Neoliberalism -
the Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 5 SEATTLE J. Soc. JusT. 536, 539-40
(2007).
155. L. 1382, julio 12, 2000, [44082] DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). This provision
brought two changes. First, higher courts that rendered decisions that were to be reviewed
under the protection of constitutional rights doctrine had to be noticed. Second, the
Supreme Court had to review actions filed against its own decisions and then submitted to
the Constitutional Court for revision. Nonetheless, the mandatory notice did not solve the
existing nuisances, nor did Supreme Court judges accede to examine petitions to review its
own decisions. Conflict persisted; several sanctions were imposed by the Supreme Council
of the Judiciary disciplinary branch on judges under prevarication grounds as a result of
their refusal to comply with decisions rendered by the Constitutional Court.
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In short, Colombia's experience is consistent with our framework. An
institutionally determined appointment structure led to a lack of stable majorities
on the Constitutional Court. This exacerbated inter-court conflicts of jurisdiction,
ultimately requiring political intervention.
E. The Special Case of the French Constitutional Council
The Conseil Constitutionnel is a specialized body separated from the
judiciary and the other branches of government.' 56 It could be considered more
like a fourth branch of government, or a third house of the legislature, rather than
a judicial court.157 The French Constitutional Court was originally conceived as a
political body that progressively has evolved in its judicial competences. Not
surprisingly, politics has been part of the court from its early stages. Formally, the
duty of the Conseil is to ensure that the principles and rules of the Constitution are
upheld.' 58 Therefore, the Conseil was established in 1958 to act as a watchdog on
behalf of the executive branch; French antipathy to judicial interference in
governmental affairs is well-known.'59
The Conseil is composed of nine members who serve nine-year,
nonrenewable terms.' 60 Appointments are staggered every three years.' 6 ' The
president, the president of the National Assembly, and the president of the Senate
each name three members.' 62 In addition to the nine members, former presidents
of France are considered members of the constitutional council for life.' 63 The
appointments to the Conseil are not always judges. In a few rare cases, they are
not even legally trained 64 and are sometimes professional politicians. 6 5
156. See STONE, supra note 4, at 47-48. See also 1958 Const. 37, 41 (Fr.).
157. See Michael H. Davis, The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil
Constitutionnel and the U.S. Supreme Court, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 45, 52 (1986); Michael
H. Davis, A Government ofJudges: An Historical Re-View, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 559, 559-
79 (1987); Denis Tallon, The Constitution and the Courts in France, 27 AM. J. COMP. L.
567, 575 (1979).
158. 1958 CoNsT. 37, 41 (Fr.).
159. This emerged as a natural reaction against the judges under the monarchy and the
role of civil law in subordinating the courts to the legislature. However, France has a long
tradition of legal control of executive action by the Conseil d'itat, which by necessity has
had to immerse itself in politics. See Burt Neubome, Judicial Review and Separation of
Powers in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 385 (1982); Cynthia
Vroom, The Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in France: the Conseil
Constitutionnel Since 1971, 63 TUL. L. REV. 265, 309-14 (1988).
160. JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 34 (1992).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 1958 CONsT. 56 (Fr.).
164. See BELL, supra note 160, at 35-36 (arguing that the goals of selection aim at
achieving competence, legitimacy, and participation. In his view, this naturally results in
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The Conseil presents a difficult case to analyze. Its collegiality precludes
evaluating individual behavior. In addition, its judicial deliberations are secret,
and it endorses a facade of unanimity with no dissenting opinions.' 66 Thus, there
is a dearth of methods for detecting division. 167 Nevertheless, there are clues that
provide some support for our position.
First, the court majority has been unstable. The right overwhelmingly
dominated the council while Gaullists were in government, but the election of the
socialist Francois Mitterand in 1986 had a profound influence. The rising
influence of the socialists in the 1980s was reflected in a left-wing majority from
1986 to 2002.161 Since 2002, the right has again dominated.
Given the formal role of the court, it is not surprising that the political
audience seems to have played a large role. At the same time, the particularities of
the institutional arrangement have not helped streamline the interaction between
this court and the other major courts (Cour de Cassation and Conseil d'Etat). To
start, the Conseil is not formally a part of the French judiciary.169 Until 2009,
Conseil decisions were addressed only to the legislature. 170 France had a form of
abstract and preventive constitutional review that no individuals other than
specific political actors could access.' 7 1
Still, there is some indication that French constitutional judges have been
concerned with the judicial audience. There has been an effort to provide coherent
and consistent case law.172  At the same time, the shift to more general
(uncodified) principles of law has significantly influenced the Cour de Cassation,
which has tended to align the legal doctrines developed by both courts. 7 1
Traditionally, the Conseil d'Etat was less accommodating to the cooperative mode,
but that has changed in recent years. The informal sharing of clerks among the
three top courts has also contributed to the harmonization of procedure and
procedural elitism in selection where legal competences and judicial self-participation are
purely instrumental).
165. See Raphael Franck, Judicial Independence Under a Divided Polity: A Study of
the Rulings of the French Constitutional Court, 1959-2006, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 262,
263 (2009).
166. BELL, supra note 160, at 41, 47.
167. See Jean Louis Goutal, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain and
the USA, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 59-60 (1976).
168. The French "cohabitation" has been described as majority divided government in
the American literature. See CINDY SKACH, BORROWING CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN WEIMAR GERMANY AND THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC 17
(2005).
169. 1958 CONST. 56-63 (Constitutional Council) (Fr.). The judiciary is independent
of the Constitutional Council. Id. at 64-66.
170. Concrete review has been introduced recently in July 2008. Under the terms of
the new article 61-1, the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d'tat can refer to the Conseil
Constitutionnel in matters of law, a mechanism to be developed by statute soon. Id. 61-1
171. STONE, supra note 4, at 8.
172. See id. at 73.
173. MARTIN A. ROGOFF, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (2011).
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sentencing. 174 The recent reforms of 2009 introduced concrete review and will
inevitably reinforce the importance judicial audience, and we can expect some
significant skirmishes in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has proposed an explanation for why Kelsenian constitutional
courts may be less fragmented than a mere attitudinal model would suggest.
Constitutional judges want to advance their ideological agenda; however, they
face competition from other high courts in terms of influencing the law and the
court system. In order to advance their ideological agenda, constitutional judges
need to have influence over other high courts, requiring them to sacrifice
immediate ideological goals through demonstrating unity. When the composition
of constitutional courts is unstable or divided, however, this unity is more difficult
to achieve, and one result is conflict.
This article has provided preliminary empirical evidence and reviewed
several important cases from the perspective of our theory. All cases reveal a
significantly politicized constitutional court in terms of the appointment
mechanism and political audience. Some cases exhibit a more tense relationship
between the constitutional court and other higher courts (Italy, Spain, Colombia,
and Korea), whereas other cases show a more collaborative mode (Germany,
France, and Portugal). Taiwan represents both patterns at different periods in its
history: a cooperative attitude during dictatorship, and a struggle for power during
democracy, leading to constitutional court dominance. This article identified
factors that account for the varying developments observed in these jurisdictions;
namely, stable and consistent court majority, and the legal and judicial stature of
the constitutional court. With increased stability, constitutional courts are better
able to overcome tendencies toward internal fragmentation and thus are better able
to assert superiority over other courts.
174. See LASSER, supra note 62, at 41 (discussing how decisions by the French
Constitutional Court are as short and declarative as the ones by the Cour de Cassation to
make them look similar and more influential, and also how the Conseil d'Etat was initially
hostile but now accepts that case law dictated by the Conseil is a source of law).
